Germany is so scared of inflation that
is even willing to endure a 26% unemployment rate for years if needed
... in Spain. Or in Italy. Of course. Forget about it: the problem we
face has nothing to do with sovereign debt, with predatory banks
or with the housing bubble either. It is a problem of governance.
Does anyone doubt that if the catastrophic unemployment figures were chastising Germany the eurozone would be making completely different
policies? I'm sure we'd have a European New Deal from the very first
minute of the sinking of the labor market and I believe that any
honest economist will tell you the same thing, even though he or she
were ideologically against it.
It's easy to be rigorous and be
stubbornly wrong when the price is paid by someone else. The problem
here is that countries in trouble have ceded monetary instruments to
Europe and have renounced fiscal instruments honouring European
stability pacts -in the case of Spain even through an express reform
of the Constitution- in short, have ceded economic sovereignty to
Europe, and do not have absolutely any instrument powerful enough to
mend the situation. Spanish democracy, if there ever was one, is
vacuous when the sovereignty that matters, which must act immediately
and forcefully against the tragedy that is costing lives, does not
depend on people's votes.
![]() |
The oxymoron of capitalist democracy |
The so-called internal devaluation, the
"solution" that seems to be applying, isn't valid for many
reasons: firstly because, unlike a devaluation of the currency, it is
asymmetrical and uneven, driving those who are in weak bargaining
positions within the economy to lose a lot, while others in positions
of power even win with it, it is to say: it's not neutral at all,
serves the 1%'s interests. Secondly, because during the process the
welfare state is being dismantled, and although ours is obviously
imperfect, it's the model of relative equality and security that we
had provided ourselves with: public health and education are being
destroyed, the social protection networks collapse. Thirdly, and may
be most importantly, because it is too slow. Today's unemployed
workers, those who are living the tragedy of the eviction, the young
unemployed graduates, the long-term unemployed people and the
families with no income whatsoever can't wait for solutions in 2018.
Actually, the internal devaluation is not a solution, there is no
policy behind, it is the simple realization that we are in such a bad
situation that real wages are falling and will eventually reach a
level low enough to make our country competitive again, through the
price mechanisms. But when will they have fallen so much to become
competitive within the world's global markets? And how much will have
to fall for that? Spain should not aspire to compete through the
argument of price but through the innovation and quality ones, and
can do so because it's got many highly educated young professionals.
This might be the real main reason that impels Germany -through its
ECB- to act so blindly and to punish us: because that would
send us to the second division and, thereby, would eliminate a
potential competitor.
As a matter of fact the European
Periphery do have a last instrument: we may leave the euro or
threaten to do so if Europe doesn't take seriously a 26% unemployment
rate. And here we face a second problem of governance: any legitimate
government accountable to informed voters would have already gone to
Brussels and would have striken its fist on the table. But our
governments are cognitively captured by the Washington Consensus and
the neoliberal orthodoxy and think, thanks to the deeply undemocratic
bipartisanship system imposed on us in the Spanish transición,
that their position is safe, that they can simply alternate one
another until hopefully one day the crisis will be over by itself.
![]() |
The ECB President and the Spanish Economy Minister having fun |
That several important countries like
Spain and Italy, along with some others such as Greece, Portugal and
Ireland were to leave the euro or threatened to do so may be a
tragedy, but mostly for the euro. For outgoing countries
it would be a chance to regain the economic policy instruments they
need to lift themselves and the ability to devalue their currencies
and avoid the drain of the internal devaluation, so that the losses
from the withdrawal of the common currency would be more than offset.
In fact, it is not clear that there had to be any significant loss:
EU countries which didn't enter the euro (Denmark, Sweden and even
the Eastern European countries that did not meet the convergence
criteria) are doing much better than those that entered, and those outside the currency that find themselves in the edge of serious troubles, namely the UK, it's because they also bought the
austerity ideas. The tragedy would be for the euro in terms of
political prestige, huge legal mess and economic credibility and
influence.
In conclusion, governance is the
problem: the incentives of economic policy makers affecting Spain are
misaligned with the interests of Spain. It is a problem of democracy,
and what we are seeing, therefore, is a disgrace to the citizens of a
system they perceive in a more or less explicit way that doesn't
respond to their needs and lately even works against their interests.
The model discredits itself and this process, which is increasingly
accelerating, will ultimately bring to radical political demands for
change. The question is whether these changes will lead to a true
democracy, more transparent, more direct and better or to something
else and potentially dangerous. And the other relevant question is what
will be the cost in economic decline, in destruction of the welfare
state, in cutting prospects for young people and in human lives.
0 comentaris :
Publica un comentari a l'entrada